Obligation de cohérence discursive: le cas des présuppositions

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Introduction I

(1) a. Jean a fait une grosse erreur. Il ne la fera plus.
John made a big mistake. He won't do it again

b. # Jean a fait une grosse erreur. Il ne la fera pas.
John made a big mistake. He won't do it

(2) a. Jo had fish and Mo did too
b. # Jo had fish and Mo did

Introduction II

- presupposition entailed by the current discourse
- (a) cases : the presupposition is **bound** (i.e., no accommodation)
- at the level of the whole discourse, the content of the presupposition is **redundant**
- use of a presupposition trigger **obligatory**

Redundancy

assertion – assertion : ✗

(3) # It's raining. It's raining

presupposition – assertion : ✗

(4) # John knows that it's raining. It's raining.

[van der Sandt, 1988]

assertion – presupposition : ✓

(5) a. It's raining. John knows that it's raining.
b. John made a mistake. He won't do it again.

Redundancy

assertion – assertion : ✗

(6) # It's raining. It's raining

presupposition – assertion : ✗

(7) # John knows that it's raining. It's raining.

[van der Sandt, 1988]

assertion – presupposition : **Obligatory**

(8) a. It's raining. John knows that it's raining.
b. John made a mistake. He won't do it again.

Outline

- Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives
  - Kaplan : obligatory-ness of *too*
  - Krifka : distinctiveness constraint
  - Sæbø : back to presupposition
- Data
  - Many triggers are obligatory
  - Not all triggers are obligatory
- Proposals
  - Class of triggers
  - Pragmatic explanation
- Open issues
  - Obligatory-Ness ?
  - Discourse sensitivity
  - Variation of obligatory-ness
  - Particles with asserted content
  - Argumentative orientation

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives

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Kaplan : obligatory-ness of *too* (1)

(9) a. Jo had fish and Mo did too
b. ∗ Jo had fish and Mo did

(10) a. Reagan frightens Jo but he does Mo too
b. ∗ Reagan frightens Jo but he does Mo

[Kaplan, 1984]

Discourse role

too "emphasize the similarity between members of a pair of contrasting items" (p. 516)

Kaplan : obligatory-ness of *too* (2)

- limited to 'bisentential' *too* (S_1 and/but S_2 too)
- unclear predictions
- variation of obligatory-ness connected to variation of contrast

(11) a. Jo likes syntax and she likes phonetics (?∅ / too).
b. Jo likes syntax but she likes phonetics (*∅ / too).
c. Jo has lived in NY and she has lived in LA (∅ / too).

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint

- Additive particles occurring after their focus
- Focus and topic accents

(12) a. A : What did Peter and Pia eat ?

b. B : $*$ P/eter ate p\asta, and P/ia ate p\asta

c. B′ : P/eter ate p\asta, and P/ia ate pasta, t\oo

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint (2)

- Congruent answer and focus accent

(13) a. A : What did Peter eat ?
b. B : Peter ate pasta
c. B′ : ∗ Peter ate pasta

- Partial answer and contrastive topic accent [Büring, 1998]

(14) a. A : What did Peter and Pia eat ?
b. B : ∗ Peter ate pasta
c. B′ : Peter ate pasta

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint (3)

Distinctiveness constraint

If $[\ldots T \ldots C \ldots]$ is a contrastive answer to a question, then there is no alternative T' of T such that the speaker is willing to assert $[\ldots T' \ldots C \ldots]$.

- *too* allows to violate distinctiveness

(15) a. A : What did Peter and Pia eat ?

b. B : $*$ P/eter ate p\asta, and P/ia ate p\asta

c. B′ : P/eter ate p\asta, and P/ia ate pasta, t\oo

Krifka : distinctiveness constraint (4)

- A contrastive topic accent in the first part of the a triggers a distinctiveness implicature
- *too* "cancels" this implicature

→ The obligatory-ness of *too* is explained only when there is a contrastive accent

→ Only additive particles are concerned

Sæbø : back to presupposition I

(16) When the gods arrive at Jotunheim, the giants prepare the wedding feast. But during the feast, the bride —Thor, that is— devours an entire ox and eight salmon. He also drinks three barrels of beer. This astonishes Thrym. But Loki averts the danger by explaining that Freyja has been looking forward to coming to Jotunheim so much that she has not eaten for a week. When Thrym lifts the bridal veil to kiss the bride, he is startled to find himself looking into Thor's burning eyes. This time, (# ∅ / too), Loki saves the situation, explaining that the bride has not slept for a week for longing for Jotunheim.

Sæbø : back to presupposition II

- The obligatory-ness of *too* should be explained by the inferences triggered by the *second* sentence

(17) Swift Deer could see pine-clad mountains on the other side of the Rain Valley. Far away to the east and west the dry prairies stretched out as far as the eye could see. (i) To the north lay the yellow-brown desert, a low belt of green cactus-covered ridges and distant blue mountain ranges with sharp peaks. (ii) To the south (# ∅ / too) he could see mountains.

Sæbø : back to presupposition III

- Presupposition more important than contrast
- Explanation based on a reasoning triggered by the second sentence

Summary

- Importance of presupposition
- Rôle of discourse function
- What is the class of triggers involved ?

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives
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Additive particles

(18) a. Jean est malade, Marie est malade (# ∅ / aussi)
John is sick, Mary is sick (∅ / too)

(19) a. Jean n'est pas malade, Marie n'est pas malade (# ∅ / non plus)
John is not sick, Mary is not sick (∅ / either)

Aspectual particles

(20) a. Léa a fait une bêtise. Elle ne la (# ∅ / re-)fera pas.
Lea did a silly thing. She won't (∅ / re-) do it.

b. Il était là hier, il est (# ∅ / encore / toujours) là.
He was there yesterday, he is (∅ / again / still) there

c. Il a appelé hier. Il a de nouveau appelé aujourd'hui
He called yesterday. He called again today

d. Ce site a été créé il y a deux ans. Il n'existe (# pas / plus)
This site was created two years ago. It doesn't exist (∅ / anymore)

Factive verbs (1)

- know *that* vs. know *whether*

(21) a. Léa est partie en Afrique. Jean ne le dit à personne, bien qu'il sache (# si / que) elle est partie là-bas.
Lea's gone to Africa. John tells no one, even though he knows (whether / that) she's gone there

Factive verbs (2)

- vérifier *que* vs. vérifier *si*

(22) a. Il y a eu une fuite d'eau, mais quelqu'un l'a réparée. Jean a appelé le plombier pour qu'il vérifie (? si / que) le problème est réglé.
There was a leakage, but somebody fixed it. Jean called the plumber so that he checks (whether / that) the problem is solved

Factive verbs (3)

- ignorer *que* vs. ignorer *si*

(23) a. Jean est revenu de vacances. Mais comme il n'a téléphoné à personne, au bureau, tout le monde ignore (? si / que) il est chez lui.
John has come back from vacation. But since he called no one, at his office everybody 'ignores' (whether / that) he is at home.

Clefts and prosody

- Clefts and prosody in English

(24) a. Someone fixed the dinner. It is John who did it.
b. Someone fixed the dinner. JOHN did it.
c. # Someone fixed the dinner. John did it.

- Clefts in French

(25) a. Quelqu'un a préparé le dîner. Ce n'est pas Jean qui l'a fait/# Jean ne l'a pas fait.
Someone fixed the dinner. It is not Jean who did it / Jean did not do it

Not all presupposition triggers

(26) a. Max owns a Ferrari. No one but Max does
b. Max owns a Ferrari. **Only** Max does

(27) a. It is raining. Bob doesn't like it when it rains.
b. It is raining. Bob **regrets** that it's raining.

Additional cases

Aspectual verbs

(28) a. ∗ John used to smoke a lot, but he does not
b. John used to smoke a lot, but he does not anymore
c. John used to smoke a lot, but he has stopped doing so

Can we talk about obligatory-ness ?

Additional cases
Definite articles

(29) a. # A father of the victim arrived at the scene

b. The father of the victim arrived at the scene

[Heim, 1991], [Sauerland, 2003]

Case with no discourse linking

Summary

- Class of triggers
- General explanation

Previous accounts : obligatory *too* and additives
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- Particles with asserted content
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- additive particles
- aspectual particles
- clefts / intonation
- some factive verbs/constructions

$\longrightarrow$ What do they have in common ?

- too $[S(f)] = S(f) + \exists f'\ f' \neq f\ \&\ S(f')$
- cleft $[S(f)] = S(f) + \exists f\ S(f)$
- again $[\exists e\ S(e)] = \exists e\ S(e) + \exists e'\ e' < e\ \&\ S(e')$
- anymore $[\text{neg}\ S(e)] = \text{neg}\ S(e) + \exists e'\ e' < e\ \&\ S(e')$
- that $[\text{s knows whether}\ P] = \text{s knows whether}\ P + P$

$$\text{trigger}\ [\phi] = \begin{array}{ccc} \phi & + & \psi \\ \text{assertion} & + & \text{presupposition} \end{array}$$

Triggers with no asserted content

Consider two sentences, S_1 and S_2, which only differ with respect to their presuppositional content P.

S_1 $\langle A, \emptyset \rangle$ *i.e.* S_1 asserts A and conveys no presupposition

S_2 $\langle A, P \rangle$ *i.e.* S_1 asserts A and presupposes P

We claim that in a context where the content P has been asserted, the use of S_2 is obligatory.

(30) a. # P. S_1.
b. P. S_2.

Larger class ?

It might be the case that triggers **with** asserted content play a role :

- they can't be obligatory
- when they perform the discourse linking, no other trigger is obligatory

A Pragmatic Explanation (1)

- Starting point : *maximize presupposition*

(31) a. # A father of the victim arrived at the scene

b. The father of the victim arrived at the scene

$\langle$a, the$\rangle$ forms an alternative pair

Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible

[Heim, 1991]

In Sauerland / Percus terminology, (31) is unfelicitous because it triggers an implicated presupposition / antipresupposition incompatible with background knowledge

A Pragmatic Explanation (2)

(32) John made a mistake. He won't do it (# ∅ / again).

Assertion : *John made a mistake*
Choice : S_1 : He won't do it
S_2 : He won't do it again

- S_2 is 'presuppositionaly stronger' than S_1

$S_2 \rightarrow S_1$ but not $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$
S_1 antipresupposes 'John made a mistake' *i.e.*
S_1 implicates 'John didn't make any mistake', which is incompatible with the assertion of the first sentence. Thus (A. S_1) is unfelicitous.

On the contrary, S_2 doesn't convey any antipresupposition.
Thus (A. S_2) is felicitous

A Pragmatic Explanation (3)

- Percus' alternative pairs :
  $\langle$the, a$\rangle$, $\langle$both, every$\rangle$, $\langle$the, every$\rangle$, ...

- our pairs :
  $\langle$too, $\emptyset\rangle$, $\langle$again, $\emptyset\rangle$, $\langle$anymore, $\emptyset\rangle$, $\langle$cleft, $\emptyset\rangle$,
  $\langle$that, whether$\rangle$, ...

Difference : $\langle$TR(S), S$\rangle$

Krifka's proposal



Our proposal



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Obligatory-Ness ?

(33) a. Barb is seventeen, and WENDY is old enough to have a driver's license, too
b. # Barb is seventeen, and WENDY is old enough to have a driver's license

[Green, 1968]

(34) a. The 5000 m race was won by Gianni Romme. The 1500 m race was won by a Dutch skater.
b. The 5000 m race was won by Gianni Romme. The 1500 m race was won by a Dutch skater too. [Sæbø, 2004]

Discourse sensitivity
Enumeration

(35) a. Jean est malade, Marie est malade, Paul est malade, tout le monde est malade alors !
John is sick, Marie is sick, Paul is sick, everybody is sick then !

- Specific prosody for enumeration

(36) John is sick + *enumeration contour*
sick(j) + $\exists x\ (x \neq j \wedge sick(x))$

"cataphoric presupposition"

Discourse sensitivity

Contrast/parallel

(37) a. Il était là hier, il est là aujourd'hui
He was there yesterday, he is there today
b. Il était là hier, il est encore là aujourd'hui
He was there yesterday, he is still there today

Variation of obligatory-ness

Back to Kaplan

- Variability of obligatory-ness

(38) a. Jo likes syntax and she likes phonetics (?∅ / too).

b. Jo likes syntax but she likes phonetics (*∅ / too).

c. Jo has lived in NY and she has lived in LA (ø / too).

- Tentative explanation

(39) a. Jo likes syntax and [she likes phonetics]$_F$ (?∅ / too).

b. Jo likes syntax but she likes [phonetics]$_F$ (*∅ / too).

Particles with asserted content

(40) A : Est-ce que Marie est venue ?
B : Oui.
A : Et Jean ? / Jean aussi ? / * Jean ? (cf Engdalh)

(41) A : Marie est venue.
B : Est-ce que Jean est venu (*∅ / aussi / lui) ?

(42) – Marie est légère
– Moi, je suis légère (*∅ / aussi)

Argumentative orientation

(43) Luc connaît tous les invités et Max en connaît (aussi / ∅) la plupart
Luc knows all the guests and Max (also / /emptyset) knows most of them

(44) a. Luc ne connaît pas tous les invités, et Max en connaît seulement quelques uns
Luc doesn't know all the guests, and Max only knows some of them

b. * Luc ne connaît pas tous les invités, et Max aussi en connaît seulement quelques-uns
Luc doesn't know all the guests, and Max too only knows some of them

Conclusion

- Obligatory-ness : wide phenomenon
  obligatory discourse linking
- Natural class of presupposition triggers
- Reasoning about alternatives relevant fo discourse linking
- Additional argument in favor of presupposition as anaphora
- Issues :
  - Articulation with discourse still to be understood
  - How reasonable is it to assume a comparison between "S" and "S + too" ?
  - how many classes of pairs ?
    $\langle$too, $\emptyset\rangle$
    $\langle$both, every$\rangle$: *both* asserts every and presupposes $|n| = 2$
    $\langle$the, a$\rangle$: *the* doesn't assert *a*.

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